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Religiosity and Migration: 
Travel into Ones’ Self versus Travel across Cultures
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This paper examines differences in religious behaviors of the native born and immigrants in 
Europe, measured as self-reported religiosity, frequency of praying, and frequency of church 
attendance. Using the European Social Survey, we first show that, on average, religiosity of 
immigrants is higher than that of the native born, even among those without a religious 
affiliation. We test hypotheses that can explain these observations. Differences in individual 
characteristics, such as age, education, income, marital status, and notably denominations, 
partly account for the overall differences. Religiosity of immigrants declines with duration in 
the destination. Both origin and destination country characteristics, such as economic 
development, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards religion 
are important predictors of religiosity. These external factors are able to fully explain the 
difference in church attendance between immigrants and the native born. 
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Secularization has become a universal feature of the European societies over the past century 
(Davie, 2000). While Europeans progressively diminish not only church attendance, but even mere 
affiliation to any religion, concerns have been expressed about different religious behavior of 
immigrants
1. These concerns translate into vivid political and social debates about cultural, and more 
specifically, religious integration of immigrants, and even lead to banning the construction of minarets in 
Switzerland in 2009, as well as banning public appearance in full Islamic face veil in Belgium and in 
France in 2010. 
Much of these debates presume that immigrants’ religious behavior is inherently different from 
that of the native born, and, importantly, particularly rigid and persistent over time. Some of the recent 
economic research also pointed in this direction, documenting a strong persistence of religious identity 
(Bisin and Verdier, 2000), and of immigrants’ religious identity in particular (Bisin et al., 2008)
2.  
The purpose of this paper is to advance the literature on the religiosity of immigrants in Europe, 
and to examine closer the hypothesis of religiosity’s persistence.  
We show that immigrants indeed have an overall higher degree of religiosity than the native born 
within the same religious denomination, and even among individuals without a religion. We propose 
several explanations to this observation.  
First, we suggest that differences in certain individual characteristics between immigrants and the 
native born may translate into differences in religiosity. Immigration represents an important moment in 
the life of an individual, and, hence, higher religiosity may be a natural response to a profound life 
change caused by migration
3. Church attendance as a social expression of religiosity may also be an 
                                                            
1 In this paper, the term “church” is used to refer to any place of religious worship, regardless of the religion. 
2 The literature leaves open the question of overall potentially different assimilation patterns for Muslim immigrants. For most 
recent studies, see Constant et al. (2006) and Manning and Roy (2010) for a debate. 
3 There may also be immigrants’ selection in terms of religiosity: only more religious individuals migrate. Such selection, however, 
is not likely to take place in a systematic way. High religiosity may not be an easily transferable component of an individuals’ 
human capital as it may have a low value at a secularized destination and may penalize an immigrant. Thus, prospective immigrants, 3 
 
essential response to the need to establish new networks. If this proposition is true, we expect to observe 
a decreasing necessity of resorting to religiosity with longer duration at destination. Such a decline, 
however, may additionally reflect a certain convergence of behavior of immigrants to that of the native 
born. 
Second, we hypothesize that religiosity can change under the influence of external factors and 
settings. We show that origin country’s characteristics, such as economic development, former 
communist past, religious freedom and societal attitudes towards religion continue to determine 
individual religiosity even after migration, suggesting that culture transmission may be taking place and 
that religiosity indeed has certain persistence. However, we also find that the role of destination country 
characteristics is paramount: religious pluralism, religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards 
religion at the destination determine religiosity of immigrants in a manner largely similar to that of the 
native born. Moreover, we show that these origin and destination country characteristics are fully able to 
account for the difference in church attendance between immigrants and the native born. 
Understanding differences in religiosity between immigrants and the native born is important for 
at least two reasons. First, it is vital to have a clear picture of religiosity’s differences in light of the 
debates on acceptance, tolerance, and integration processes of immigrants. Second, religion itself has 
been shown to predict numerous individual outcomes, such as education (Lehrer, 1999, 2004), 
employment prospects (Bisin et al., 2011), earnings (Chiswick and Huang, 2008), economic and policy 
preferences and attitudes (Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, 2003; Benabou and Tirole, 2006), health and well-
being (Regnerus, 2003; Chiswick and Mirtcheva, 2010; Connor, 2010), to name a few (see Lehrer, 2010 
for an overview). Understanding differences in religiosity may thus help shed light on differences in 
these outcomes between immigrants and the native born. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
unless they are scholars or preachers of a religion, should be discouraged from significant investments valued only at the origin, 
such as higher religiosity. Therefore, while persecuted religious minorities in an origin may have an incentive to emigrate, active 
members of a dominant religious group in an origin would be less inclined to emigrate to an alien religious culture. For an overview 
of the economics of immigrant religious adjustment, see C. Chiswick (2003). 
 4 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical setting for the 
analysis of religiosity. Section 3 describes the data to be studied, the European Social Survey (ESS) and 
the Association of Religion Data Archives data (ARDA). Section 4 discusses empirical strategy and 
results, as well as their robustness. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Determinants of Religious Outcomes: What Makes Immigrants Different? 
2.1 Individual Determinants of Religiosity 
Religiosity and religious behavior have multiple facets and can be analyzed from several 
perspectives, such as self-reported degree of religiosity, church attendance, the frequency of praying, 
donating money to church activities, the extent of belief or of devotion. In this paper, we study the first 
three aspects of religiosity separately, allowing various socio-economic factors to influence them in a 
differentiated way. The degree of religiosity and praying refer to private aspects of religiosity, to 
personal experiences and feelings. In contrast, church attendance, being an observed social, public, 
activity, combines to a greater degree the notions of human and social capital, and additionally reflects 
the need for a ritual, and an institutional attachment (Davie, 2000). The two types of religiosity, private 
and public, may be affected in a different way by life circumstances, such as migration. 
There are various reasons why individuals may be religious. Paraphrasing Azzi and Ehrenberg 
(1975) and Iannaccone (1990), religion may comprise three goods: an afterlife good, a spiritual good, 
and a social good. Religion has the “salvation motive”, and it provides benefits that extend beyond life’s 
limits. It also gives satisfaction and psychological comfort by helping answer important life questions. 
Networks created through religious practice, in addition to allowing socialization, giving access to the 
marriage market, and helping to educate children in the norms and values of this denomination, may also 
satisfy more materialistic needs, such as providing social insurance benefits, helping in hardships, 
finding employment, or creating business opportunities (Stark and Finke 2000; Scheve and Stasavage, 
2006). 5 
 
The literature suggests numerous factors that may affect religious behavior of any individual, 
regardless of their nationality status. Among the observed regularities, age, income or social class, 
belonging to a minority group, and living in rural areas have been found as significant determinants of 
religiosity, notably measured as church attendance (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975). Specifically, as with 
many other types of social participation, age is related to religious participation in a non-linear way, with 
periods of declining activity observed for 30-35 year olds (the busiest time of professional development, 
creating families and raring small children: Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), as well as for elderly 
individuals. Income, or social class, may have little impact on church attendance, but have a strong 
association with other types of religious behavior, such as donations (Iannaccone, 1998). In contrast, the 
impact of gender on religiosity is more complex, and varies across denominations: while Christian 
women are usually found to be more outwardly religious then Christian men, the opposite is true for 
Muslims and Jews (Sullivan, 2006). 
2.2 Immigration as a Personal Experience 
We expect religiosity outcomes of immigrants and of the native born to be rather different for at 
least three reasons. First, immigrants’ overall socio-economic characteristics are usually different from 
those of the native born, and these differences may translate into different religiosity and practice. If, for 
example, the native born are more likely to be elderly than immigrants, they may be less religious 
simply because religiosity tends to decrease with advanced age. One of the main individual differences 
is also a different religious affiliation (if any). Since average degree of religiosity may vary from one 
denomination to another, immigrants with a different denomination than an average native-born person 
may have a different average religiosity. 
Differences in other individual characteristics, such as income, employment, or place of 
residence may also be important. As the time since migration goes by, a convergence of these 
characteristics between immigrants and native born in economic and social terms takes place (Chiswick, 6 
 
1978; Borjas, 1995; Green, 1999; Dustmann, 2996; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009). This convergence may 
translate into greater resemblance in religious behavior.  
Second, immigration by itself represents a turning point in an individual’s life, as it exposes an 
individual to a different cultural environment, and requires changes in behavior as a response to 
changing economic and family situations. As such, it may change individual religious behavior because 
a migrant may resort to religion in a particular life moment to address profound life concerns, obtain 
psychological comfort, or mitigate loneliness (Waite and Lehrer, 2003; Connor, 2010; Lehrer, 2010). 
Stark and Finke (2000) note that, along with marriage, migration is also a major factor in religion 
switching, reflecting social adaptation and the need to form new networks. Even those migrants who 
were rarely attending a church in their origin country may start doing so at a destination, in order to meet 
both the native born and other immigrants. Indeed, churches have been primary places for ethnic 
gatherings and celebrations. Oftentimes, they serve as an “island of familiar experience […] where 
origin-specific skills (such as language, ritual, etiquette) can still yield benefits” (C. Chiswick, 2003). 
Migration networks created through religious institutions eventually play an important role in 
information transmission regarding economic opportunities in the receiving society (Borjas and Hilton, 
1996; Mayda, 2010; Munshi, 2003), housing, schooling, and obtaining immigration-related papers (see 
Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000, for an overview). They also create further opportunities for religious, civic, 
and community engagement (ASDC Report, 2002; Cyrus et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the sheer fact of being an immigrant and, oftentimes, a minority, can increase “the 
social value of religious activity [...] as discrimination may limit their [immigrants’] market 
consumption alternatives” (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975), helping to sustain a potentially different 
religiosity.  
If these hypotheses are true, immigrants’ religiosity may change as the time since migration goes 
by. Social, economic, and also religious adaptation in the host society may decrease the necessity of 
private religious practice, such as praying. Church attendance as a social expression of religiosity may 7 
 
also diminish if initial high attendance was a strategic search for networks, and if new networks outside 
of the church have been created. It may also, however, increase over time, if greater time at the 
destination gives access to greater possibilities of attendance in terms of place, time, the language of the 
service, and greater attachment to new religious networks. 
Thus, for immigrants, the years since migration may be an important predictor of religiosity. 
However, given the array of the effects that may come into play over time, we would be cautious to 
interpret the changing religiosity as a sign of positive or negative assimilation, as is usually done in 
migration studies. In addition, in the case of religiosity, integration rather than assimilation may be a 
more desirable outcome, in which the acceptance on the part of the native born, and the right to freely 
exercise one’s difference matters more
4. Immigrants may also expressively maintain their ethno-
religious identity and at the same time adapt and integrate to different degrees into the society in which 
they live (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Hillman, 2010). 
2.3 Religiosity, Economic Development and Culture 
Last but not the least reason for potential differences in religiosity between natives and the 
foreign born is the fact that immigrants come from countries that are different in terms of religious 
denomination, levels of religious practice, the cultural role of religion, and the societal and governmental 
attitudes towards the religion. Indeed, according to Gallup and Crabtree (2010), religiosity varies 
tremendously across the world, from very low levels in most of the developed countries, such as West 
European, and countries of the former Soviet bloc, to high levels in least developed countries, and in the 
US.  
The literature offers several reasons for these cross-country differences. One of the leading 
hypotheses – the secularization theory - suggests a negative link between development and religiosity, 
                                                            
4 To quote the British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, 1966: “I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their 
own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in 
a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman… I define 
integration, therefore, not a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. Quotation borrowed from Algan et al. (2010). 8 
 
predicting the decline of both religious participation and beliefs as countries advance in economic terms 
(Weber, 1993 [1922]; Martin, 1978). One of the reasons for this is that economic development produces 
numerous forms of other activities, and changes the value of time (Barro and McCleary, 2003a). 
Competition of religious participation and practice with secular activities reduces the time and effort 
devoted to the former (Gruber and Hungerman 2008). Numerous studies developed and confirmed the 
predictions of the secularization theory; most recent include Verweij, Ester, and Nauta (1997) and 
Gaskins, Golder, and Siegel (2009). 
There are some countries, however, that stand out as particularly striking exceptions to the 
predictions of this theory, and the United States is the leading example. Here, religious belief and 
practice have been remarkably stable over time, and high compared to other countries at a similar level 
of economic development (Greeley, 1989; Stark, Iannaccone, Finke, 1996). This observation gave rise to 
the religious market model (Iannaccone, 1998), according to which diversity of religions and churches, 
or religious pluralism, increases competition for adherents. By offering “better” service, competing 
religion providers encourage religiosity, be it in terms of prayer, participation, or donation (Iannaccone, 
1991; Finke, 1998).  
Despite its appealing underlying economic reasoning, empirical tests of this model produced 
mixed results. For example, the measure of religious pluralism often employed in empirical work and 
based on Herfindahl index
5 has been found to often have a negative, if any, correlation with religiosity 
(see Chaves and Gorski, 2001, for an overview of empirical studies). One of the reasons for this may be 
the fact that this measure also reflects overall tolerance and freedom of societies (Alesina et al., 2003). 
The latter, however, may favor all forms of religious beliefs and participation, including none. At the 
same time, religious freedom measured by moderate government regulation is usually found to be 
                                                            
5 Index of religious pluralism, or fractionalization (Iannaccone, 1998; Alesina, La Ferrara, 2000) is constructed according to 
the formula: 
2
i   -   1   =   RF
ki k s ∑ , where s is a share of k religion denominations in country i. This index is also known as one 
minus Herfindahl index of group shares. It measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in country i belong 
to different religions. Higher values of the index represent higher religious fragmentation, and hence, heterogeneity. 
 9 
 
positively associated with religiosity, supporting the theory’s predictions (Chaves and Cann, 1992; 
Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997; Barro, McCleary, 2003b). As an extreme example, one may consider 
the case of communist countries, where governments sought to fully suppress religion. As a result, these 
countries exhibited some of the lowest rates of religiosity (Gallup and Crabtree, 2010; Barro, McCleary, 
2003a). 
Provided that institutional, economic, and cultural developments in origin countries have long-
lasting, post-migration effects, immigrants coming from different parts of the world will be different 
from both the European native born and from other immigrants. In addition, cross-country differences in 
receiving countries may also have a differentiated impact on the religiosity of immigrants coming from 
the same country. In what follows, we assess the role of these home and host country effects in 
determining immigrants’ religiosity.  
 
3. Data Description 
3.1 The Sample  
The analysis of this paper builds on the European Social Survey, which is a Europe-wide survey 
conducted every two years. We pool the first four rounds, covering the period 2002-2009. The survey 
provides information on individual socio-economic characteristics, including their religious 
denomination and various measures of religiosity. The survey also contains information on the 
individual’s country of birth, allowing us to distinguish between natives and immigrants, and the length 
of time immigrants spent in destination countries. 
The sample is restricted to individuals 16 to 70 years of age, whose country of birth is known. 
The sample is further restricted to individuals of Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox Christian, Other 
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious denominations, and those who report they do not have a 
religion. The category “other religion” is omitted from the analysis, as this group is very heterogeneous 
and represents only 1% of the sample. We also exclude second-generation immigrants and individuals 10 
 
with one foreign-born parent from the analysis. Sample sizes of these groups of individuals are too small 
for a meaningful separate analysis. Lastly, we omit the native born without citizenship, as well as several 
destination countries
6. The final sample consists of 24 European countries of residence, 84,447 native-
born persons, defined as native-born individuals with both parents born in the country of current 
residence, and 7,017 first-generation immigrants (see Table A1 of the Appendix for more details).  
The countries of the dataset are very heterogeneous in terms of migration histories and patterns. 
Approximately 40% of all immigrants come from other Western European countries, as well as from 
Canada, Australia, and Japan. Some countries, such as Switzerland, Germany, or Great Britain, are home 
to immigrants from over twenty destinations. Others, such as Eastern European countries or Russia, host 
immigrants from just a few, mostly neighboring countries, with the native and foreign born population 
of similar ethnicity. In these countries, it would perhaps be more accurate to characterize the foreign-
born as “born outside of the country’s modern territory”, rather than immigrants. Countries like Spain 
and Greece are known to be new immigration countries, and this fact is reflected in the very low 
proportion of immigrants with more than twenty years of residence. These differences are an important 
source of variation in country characteristics and in immigrant-specific characteristics that we are going 
to explore. 
With the exception of the UK and the Netherlands, there is a certain sorting of migrants: religious 
affiliation of the majority of immigrants corresponds to the country’s main religion in most of the 
destinations (Table A1 of the Appendix). However, in most of the countries, unaffiliated immigrants 
also outnumber immigrants with a religious affiliation. Islam often comes as a second main religion 
among immigrants (and even as a first religion in Nordic countries).   
 
3.2 Measures of Religiosity 
                                                            
6 Omitted are Italy, Bulgaria, Iceland, Cyprus and Turkey, for the lack of data on foreign born, as well as Israel, for its 
specificity with regard to the studied question.  For more details on this, and on the survey in general, see 
www.europeansocialsurvey.org . See also Jowell et al. (various issues).  11 
 
Three questions measure the individual’s self-reported religiosity. First is the explicit question 
“how religious are you”, measured on the scale from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating stronger 
religiosity. In addition, there are also questions “how often do you pray”, and “how often do you attend 
religious services”, with responses ranging from “never” to “every day”, which are converted into the 
days per year (see Appendix Table A2). These three measures of religiosity are used as alternative 
dependent variables in the regression analysis. 
Self-reported measures of religiosity vary substantially among individuals with different 
denomination, and most dramatically between those who do and do not have a specific religious 
affiliation. The proportion of unaffiliated individuals in Europe is high: 44% of the native born and 39% 
of first-generation immigrants report belonging to no particular religion. Previous research has shown 
that this group is very heterogeneous, as it contains individuals with both particularly low and high 
levels of educational attainment (Keysar and Kosmin, 1995; Iannaccone, 1998), atheists, doubters, and 
people in search of a religion. In general, while secularization has been a common feature of European 
societies, it has affected primarily social aspects of religiosity, such as church attendance and donations 
(ibid), while, some argue, the need for a private search for spirituality has remained. In fact, Ekelund et 
al. (2006) suggest that in the modern societies, individuals with “no religion” are often those who are 
moving away from organized religion towards individualized belief systems, rather than individuals with 
no beliefs at all, and hence we may observe significant levels of religiosity even among these 
individuals. 
The latter proposition is confirmed by the descriptive evidence on differences in religiosity 
across individuals with and without a religious affiliation, as well as between immigrants and the native 
born (Table 1). For both immigrants and the native born, levels of all three types of religiosity are non-
negligible among non-believers, even though they are always lower compared to individuals affiliated to 
a religion. On average, first-generation immigrants with and without religious affiliation have slightly 
higher levels of all types of religiosity compared to the native born of the same category. 12 
 
3.3 Explanatory Variables  
To explain religiosity, three main types of independent variables are considered in the 
econometric analysis.  
First, these are the individual socio-economic characteristics that affect religiosity regardless of 
the nativity status. Following previous discussion, they include age and years of education, gender, 
number of household members, marital status, income, employment status (employee, unemployed, or 
self-employed, with “out of the labor force” being the omitted group), as well as urban residence 
(McCleary and Barro, 2006). We also control for individual religious denominations, including none. 
Table A2 of the Appendix provides a full definition of these variables, and Table A3 contains 
descriptive statistics for both population groups.  
Immigrants differ from the native born along numerous individual characteristics. For example, 
while there is no difference in age, in number of household members, or in household income between 
first-generation immigrants and the native born, immigrants on average have lower marriage rates and 
higher divorce rates, higher unemployment, and live in urban areas as opposed to the native born. 
Education levels between the two groups are largely similar; if anything, immigrants have slightly 
greater years of schooling. Lastly, among immigrants, there is a significantly lower share of individuals 
belonging to the main religious denomination of their country of residence, and a lower share of non-
affiliated individuals. There is a lower proportion of Roman Catholics and Protestants among 
immigrants than among natives, but a higher proportion of all other denominations. Do these differences 
explain differences in religiosity?  
Second, for first-generation immigrants, we also control for a range of immigrant-specific 
variables that are standard for this type of research. These include language, citizenship status, as well as 
years since migration. Naturally, from Table A3, immigrants have a lower rate of speaking a language of 
the country as the first language at home, or being citizens. 13 
 
Third, we also consider the role of origin and destination country cultures and societal settings 
that may affect religiosity both through culture transmission and culture adaptation processes. These 
characteristics include religious fragmentation, religious freedom, and a measure of social attitudes 
towards other religions. Using the information on the largest religious group, we also construct a 
variable “belonging major”, which takes the value of one if an individual belongs to the largest religious 
branch of the country. These data come from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). Also 
included are GDP per capita as a measure of development
7 (World Bank Development Indicators), and a 
dichotomous variable for having a communist government, presently or in the past. 
 
4. Econometric Strategy and Results 
4.1 The role of individual differences between immigrants and native born 
Our point of departure is the analysis of differences in religiosity between native-born and 
foreign-born men and women, given the differences in their individual characteristics. To this end, we 
estimate the following specification: 
Yij = αij + β1ij Xi + β2ijImmigri + β3ij Immigri*Zi + εi     (1) 
where Yij is an individual’s i outcome of interest j, j = how religious; attending religious services; 
frequency of praying. Xi is the set of individual characteristics; Immigri is a dichotomous variable for the 
first-generation immigrant, Zi is the set of immigrant-specific characteristics. 
Tables 2 to 4 contain OLS estimation results for three alternative dependent variables measuring 
religiosity. The first two dependent variables – self-assessed religiosity and praying - refer to the private 
indicators, while the third – frequency of attendance - refers to a more extravert, social, indicator of 
religiosity. All three dependent variables are treated as continuous variables.  
                                                            
7 For destination countries, GDP per capita is measured at each year of the survey. For origin countries, we use the value for 
2005, which corresponds to the mid-point of the data collection. Alternatively, we tried to include the GDP measure at time 
of migration, with similar results.  14 
 
In Tables 2-4, coefficients in columns (1) are estimated for the sub-sample of the Europeans 
living in their native country. Across all three regressions, we observe largely similar patterns. 
Religiosity is related to age in a non-linear way: it first declines with age up to a certain point in mid-
twenties – early thirties, and then starts rising.
8 Older individuals are more religious. Similarly, 
nonlinearities are observed also for the effect of the years of completed schooling. Self-reported 
religiosity decreases with education up to 10 years of formal schooling, and rises afterwards; the reversal 
is also observed around 13 years of schooling for praying. The effect of schooling is positive for 
attendance (only the square term is significant, albeit at 10%).  
On aggregate, we find that women have a higher religiosity as opposed to men
9. Individuals with 
larger households are significantly more religious. The fact of being married is only associated with 
higher self-reported religiosity, but not with praying or attendance. In contrast, divorced individuals have 
higher levels of private religiosity, but lower rates of social religiosity, as opposed to single individuals. 
We also find that religiosity is related in a negative way to household income, and is also significantly 
affected by employment status. Notably, self-employed individuals have higher rates of private 
religiosity as compared to individuals out of the labor force, while unemployed have lower religiosity 
measured by any of the variables. Furthermore, we confirm earlier findings that native-born individuals 
living in urban versus rural areas have lower religiosity.  
These regressions also control for the individual self-reported religious affiliation, including no 
affiliation at all. The benchmark category is Roman Catholics, which is one of the largest and also most 
homogeneous religious groups of the sample. There is a high diversity of religiosity among native-born 
                                                            
8 From Table 2, col.1, dREL/dAge = -0.025+ 0.041*(Age/100)*2, so that the partial effect is at its minimum at Age = 31 for 
self-reported religiosity. The partial effect is its minimum at Age = 23 for praying (Table 3, col.1), and at Age = 27 for 
attendance (Table 4, col.1). 
9 The gender effect is heterogeneous across denominations, however. In estimations done separately by denomination 
(below), we find that non-affiliated, and Christian women are more religious than men. In contrast, there is no statistically 
significant difference in self-reported religiosity and praying among Muslim men and women, while Muslim women have 
statistically significant lower attendance rate. Jewish women and men do not have different religious behavior along any of 
the three dimensions considered. 15 
 
individuals, depending on their denomination. As expected, individuals with no reported affiliation have 
significantly lower levels of religiosity as opposed to Roman Catholics, and as opposed to individuals of 
any other religious group. Protestants and Orthodox Christians, however, also have significantly lower 
religiosity compared to Roman Catholics, while other Christians have higher religiosity. The sample size 
of representatives of other denominations is relatively small to draw definite inferences; but our data 
suggest that there are no significant differences in religiosity of Muslims and Catholics, while Jews have 
lower self-reported religiosity and attendance, notwithstanding similar praying frequency.  
Columns (2) of Tables 2-4 are based on the pooled-sample estimation of native and foreign born. 
In these columns, we distinguish only between individuals having no religious allegiance (norelig 
dummy), using any other religious affiliation as a comparison group. Immigrant dummy (immigr) is 
interacted with the norelig dummy in order to assess the differentiated effect of non-affiliation for 
immigrants and for the native born. Across three regressions, we find that the simple fact of being an 
immigrant increases the levels of religiosity, even when belonging to a religious group is controlled for. 
Statistically significant interaction terms on norelig and immigr dummy variables in Tables 3 and 4 
coupled with the statistically significant immigr term suggest that even for individuals reporting no 
religious affiliation, the fact of being an immigrant amplifies religiosity. This may be due either to the 
selectivity in migration, or because all other individuals in the origin countries are more religious than in 
the destination countries, or because immigration reflects the profound life changes, and hence the need 
to refer to spirituality. In the latter case, greater religiosity of immigrants would be a transitory 
phenomenon; however, this hypothesis cannot be tested here directly, as the religiosity of individuals 
prior to migration is not known.  
Further, in columns (3) we repeat the pooled-sample estimation, including all other immigrant-
specific characteristics, such as the years since migration, language and citizenship. Private forms of 
religiosity have a clear tendency of decreasing over time, and this is especially true for praying, which is 
significantly lower for immigrants with more than 5 years of residence as compared to the newcomers. 16 
 
Despite this, private religiosity of immigrants remains overall higher than of the native born through the 
respondents’ life. If higher religiosity of immigrants upon arrival were indeed caused by the fact of 
migration, the decline of private religiosity over time could reflect the diminishing need to resort to 
religiosity as the life gets stabilized. Otherwise, this result suggests a potential immigrant’s adaptation to 
local customs. It may also be related to a marriage to a native-born spouse (the data do not allow to 
control for this directly, however). Being a citizen is associated with lower religiosity, a result that can 
also be interpreted as an attachment to the assimilation into the host society. 
In contrast, a longer duration of residence has no particular impact on church attendance. We also 
note that speaking any of the official languages of the destination country at home as a first language has 
no association with religiosity, while citizenship is negatively associated only with self-reported degree 
of religiosity.  
  Lastly, in Tables 2-4 columns (4), a separate estimation is done for the sub-sample of 
immigrants. There are several differences in the impact of individual characteristics of immigrants on 
religiosity, as contrasted to the native born (columns 1). Notably, age does not seem to matter for 
immigrants
10, as well as the employment status, while the income effect is positive for self-reported 
religiosity and insignificant for other measures. For immigrants, non-linearities of the effect of schooling 
are also present, as religiosity measures show a decline in religiosity with education, followed by an 
increase. The turning point, however, is different between immigrants and the native born. Self-reported 
religiosity decreases with the years of schooling up to 18 years, and increases thereafter (however, given 
our range of data, the positive effect is observed only for 7% of the sample of immigrants who have 
more than 18 years of schooling). The turning point for praying of immigrants is at 13 years of 
education, and at 14 years for attendance. Household size has a positive and significant effect only for 
immigrants’ praying (Table 3, column 4); it is positive but insignificant for two other measures.  
                                                            
10 If we omit the square term from regressions, age has a statistically significant negative impact on praying of immigrants, 
and a positive impact on attendance, significant at 7% .  17 
 
In terms of allegiance, both native and immigrant non-affiliated individuals, Orthodox Christians, 
and Jews have consistently lower religiosity levels than native and immigrant Catholics. In contrast, 
other Christians are more religious than Catholics, and hence more so than any other group, regardless of 
nativity. For Protestants, while lower religiosity patterns are observed among native born, no differences 
with Catholics are found for immigrants. 
 4.2 Differences in religiosity across denominations 
As a next step, we repeat the pooled regressions for the native born and first generation 
immigrants by denomination. From Table 5, compared to the native born of the same group, non-
affiliated and Roman Catholic immigrants have a significantly stronger religiosity as measured by all 
three indicators of religiosity. For Roman Catholics, there is a particularly strong evidence of declining 
religiosity with duration at the destination. Among Protestants, immigrants have only a slightly higher 
tendency of reporting a higher religiosity, while Orthodox immigrants only pray more than Orthodox 
natives, and these differences remain intact with duration. There is no apparent difference between the 
native- and foreign-born respondents from other branches of Christianity.  
Unfortunately, the sample sizes are particularly small for Muslims (252 natives and 832 
immigrants
11) and Jews (44 natives and 24 immigrants). The results for these two groups suggest that 
both Muslim and Jewish immigrants also have a higher religiosity as compared to the native-born 
individuals of similar religious groups, and that they also have a tendency to decline over time (the only 
exception is higher religiosity of Jews with 6 to 10 years after migration). However, given the small 
sample size for Jews, we are cautious to interpret these results as definitive. 
                                                            
11 Muslim native born may be sorted differently across countries than immigrants. We check this possibility, and find that in 
our sample, there are no Muslim natives in Switzerland, Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, and Norway. The largest 
concentration of Muslim natives is in Russia (66%), Greece (15%), Great Britain (3%), and Slovenia (3%). The largest 
concentration of Muslim immigrants is in Germany (13%), the Netherlands (10%), Switzerland (10%), and Great Britain 
(9%); Muslim immigrants are more evenly distributed across countries than Muslim natives. There are no Muslims in the 
Czech Republic or Hungary neither among immigrants nor among the native born. 
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4.3 Religiosity and Home and Host Country Characteristics 
Further, we explore the role of home and host country economic, cultural, and institutional 
characteristics that affect religiosity, as well as the robustness of previous results to the inclusion of 
these variables (Table 6).  
The results for the native born (Table 6, column 1) suggest that host country characteristics are 
indeed important predictors of religiosity. In line with previous studies, higher GDP per capita has a 
negative association with all three forms of religiosity, consistently with the secularization theory (Barro 
and McCleary, 2003a; Verweij, Ester, Nauta, 1997). In contrast, the religious markets theory, as tested 
by the measure of religious fragmentation, is rejected, as suggested by the negative sign on this variable, 
and which is also consistent with numerous previous findings (Chaves and Gorski, 2001). However, 
religious freedom, which may also be viewed as the opposite of government regulation, has a positive 
association with religiosity, perhaps by increasing the efficiency of religion providers (Iannaccone, 
Finke, Stark 1997; Chaves and Cann, 1992). Social regulation has a positive effect, suggesting that 
societies with more conservative views and attitudes encourage religious behavior (Gaskins, Golder, and 
Siegel, 2009). For this variable in particular, however, the direction of causality may also be reversed: 
social regulation may be greater in more conservative societies. Religious minorities may feel besieged 
and respond by grouping together, while members of religious minorities with a weaker attainment may 
convert to major religion. Thus, we do not give a causal interpretation to this result. This logic is also 
confirmed by the coefficient on the variable belonging major which suggests that individuals sharing the 
main religion of the country tend to be less religious than those belonging to any other religion. 
For immigrants, the results (Table 6, column 3) reveal that, for them, the same residence country 
characteristics have a largely similar effect as for the native born. The magnitudes of some coefficients 
differ, but the directions and the overall patterns are largely the same. Immigrants in countries with high 
religious pluralism tend to be less religious, while both religious freedom and stricter social attitudes 
have a positive association with religiosity. One notable exception is the impact of the GDP per capita 19 
 
variable, which is positive for personal religiosity, and insignificant for other variables. Potentially, it 
may reflect the “gratification” effect, especially for immigrants from poorer countries, who may feel 
more religious as a result of being more thankful for their better living conditions and economic 
opportunities. Overall, the fact that any of the destination country characteristics is of importance for 
immigrants is an interesting finding in itself. It suggests that religiosity is not a completely rigid trait, 
and that it does change under the influence of external factors, notably religious institutions and culture 
in which an individual is placed, as well as with duration at destination, as seen above. 
From Table 6 column (3), we also note that similar country of origin characteristics also continue 
playing a role after migration, although their effect is much more disparate. Consistently with other 
studies, and across dependent variables, GDP at the origin has a negative impact on religiosity, as well 
as the former communist past (Barro and McCleary, 2005). Religious freedom has a positive association 
only with personal types of religiosity, but not with the attendance; while social attitudes at the origin 
only affect attendance, but not the personal religiosity. 
In pooled estimation (Table 6, column 2), the variable immigr remains significantly positive for 
measures of personal religiosity. Personal religiosity remains persistently higher among immigrants 
throughout lifetime, albeit decreasing over time, even when origin and destination country 
characteristics are accounted for. This suggests that, while external factors are important for the 
individual introvert measures of religiosity, they are not fully able to account for differences between 
immigrants and native born. There may be other factors related to culture, education, or experience, that 
continue shaping the differences between natives and foreign born. It also may be the fact personal 
religiosity is indeed strongly affected by the personal experience of migration. Migration acts as a 
personal transformation process, a travel into ones’ self, and experiences related to the fact of migration 
have a long-term effect on individual relationship with religiosity or spirituality in a broad sense. 
In contrast, once we control for origin and destination effects, there is no longer any difference 
between immigrants and the native born in terms of church-going: the variable immigr becomes 20 
 
insignificant. Equally, there is no evidence that church-going changes with the years since migration. 
Individual and external factors, such as economic, cultural, and institutional are fully able to explain the 
differences in church-going between immigrants and the native born.  
We also check the robustness of all these results to the definition of dependent variables and the 
estimation method. In particular, we recode the dependent variables into dichotomous variables. “How 
religious are you” gets a value of one if an individual reports any value of religiosity above 5, and zero 
otherwise. “How often do you pray” and “how often do you attend religious services” gets a value of 
one if an individual reports doing these activities more often than once a month. Probit estimation results 
are consistent with previous OLS results, but are not reported here to save the space. Some differences in 
these results with respect to the OLS results in Table 6 are that social attitudes and religious freedoms at 
origin gain positive signs for any religiosity measure. Compared to the results in Table 5, praying 
decreases with the years since migration for all religious denominations except Muslims, and attending 
also decreases significantly over time for Orthodox migrants and individuals with no religious 
affiliation. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provided a Europe-wide analysis of differences in religiosity between immigrants and 
the native born, measured in terms of self-assessed religiosity, frequency of praying, and church 
attendance. According to the descriptive statistics, immigrants have higher religiosity as compared to the 
native born measured along these three dimensions, and regardless of their religious denomination. We 
suggest that, all other things equal, two main sets of explanations account for these differences.  
First, there are several differences in the role of individual characteristics of immigrants in 
explaining religiosity, as contrasted to the native born. Both native and immigrant females have higher 
religiosity than males; however, this effect varies by denomination. Age and education affect religiosity 
of the native born in a non-linear way, with lowest levels of religiosity observed in late twenties and 
among individuals with 10 to 13 years of schooling. For immigrants, age non-linear effects are absent, 21 
 
while the impact of education is the lowest for 13 to 18 years of schooling, depending on the measure of 
religiosity.  
Marital status has a strong association with religiosity of the native born, but not of immigrants 
(only the fact of being divorced increase the frequency of praying for immigrants). Household size has a 
positive and significant effect for any measure of religiosity of the native born, but only for immigrants’ 
praying. For the native born, income has a negative association with religiosity, while for immigrants, 
this effect is positive for self-reported religiosity, and insignificant for other measures. Other individual 
characteristics seem not to matter for immigrants’ religiosity. 
For immigrants, religiosity, especially in its private form (self-reported religiosity or praying), 
has a tendency to decline with the years since migration. This decline suggests that a certain adaptation 
to the life in the destination country’s environment is taking place. Church attendance as a social 
expression of religiosity may also be an essential response to the need to establish new networks, to 
mitigate loneliness, and to capitalize on the origin-specific human capital even after migration. These 
benefits of attendance may also decline as outside options in the destination country appear for a 
migrant.  
Second, contrary to popular perceptions, religiosity is not an absolutely rigid personal trait, but it 
can and does change under the influence of external economic and social factors and settings into which 
an individual lives. Specifically, origin countries’ characteristics continue determining immigrants’ 
outcomes even after migration. However, the impact of these factors is much more disparate and 
relatively weak as compared to the destination country characteristics, such as religious pluralism, 
religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards religion. These results suggest that external factors play 
an important role in private expressions of religiosity, in addition to personal needs and transformations 
caused by migration. For social expressions of religiosity, such as church attendance, external factors 
fully account for the religiosity differential between immigrants and the native born. These findings cast 
doubt on the recent restrictive measures adopted by some European governments’ vis-à-vis religious 22 
 
minorities, which assume little responsiveness of immigrants to the environment in which they live, and 
little religious integration and adaptation. Some European governments might be trying to speed up the 
assimilation process, without recognizing the more general role of the existing environment in this 
process. 
The analysis of this paper is based primarily on the European Social Survey, which covers most 
of the European countries. This type of analysis is particularly rare in the European setting, as many 
countries forbid the collection of religion data by government authorities. Thus, the analysis of the paper 
has an additional value-added of outlining religiosity patterns among the European native born. 
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Table 1. Variation of Religiosity (Percent) across Religiousness and Immigrant Status 
Native born  Foreign born   
No religion  Belongs to a 
religion 
No religion  Belongs to a 
religion 
 
Degree of religiosity: percent of individuals 
     
     Low (scale 0)  31,39  1,76  27,84  2,01 
     Moderate (scale 1-4)  53,45  42,08  49,13  36,05 
     High (scale 5-10)  15,16  56,16  23,03  61,94 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Average value (scale 0-10)  2,61  5,89  3,22  6,35 
 
Frequency of praying: percent of individuals 
     
     Low (never)  69,97  16,21  57,68  12,58 
     Moderate (special holidays, or rarer)  18,28  24,07  21,49  21,81 
     High (once a month or more often)  11,75  59,72  20,83  65,61 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Average  value(scale  0-10)  17,13 124,58 37,36  153,39 
 
Attendance of religious service: percent of individuals 
     
     Low (never)  63,50  13,88  58,96  15,70 
     Moderate (special holidays, or rarer)  33,30  45,44  36,11  45,62 
     High (once a month or more often)  3,20  40,68  4,93  38,68 
Total 100  100  100  100 
Average value(scale 0-10)  1,77  20,99  2,68  23,03 
Percent  of  sub-sample  42,20 57,80 37,56  62,44 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the European Social Survey, 2002-2009. 29 
 
Table 2. Analysis of Religiosity: How Religious Are You? 
 




  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
Age -0.025**  (0.006)  -0.010*  (0.004) -0.021** (0.006)  0.030  (0.027) 
Age squared/100  0.041**  (0.007)  0.025**  (0.004)  0.035**  (0.007)  -0.037  (0.029) 
Education years  -0.042**  (0.014)  -0.090**  (0.009) -0.077** (0.013) -0.181** (0.044) 
Education squared  0.002**  (0.001)  0.003**  (0.000)  0.003**  (0.000)  0.005**  (0.002) 
Female 0.628**  (0.026)  0.695**  (0.016)  0.602**  (0.026)  0.463**  (0.106) 
N hh members  0.126**  (0.013)  0.097**  (0.007)  0.132**  (0.012)  0.079  (0.042) 
Married 0.220**  (0.038)  0.187**  (0.024)  0.203**  (0.038)  -0.043  (0.159) 
Divorced 0.185**  (0.049)  0.145**  (0.031)  0.181**  (0.048)  0.206  (0.193) 
Log of hh income  -0.187**  (0.014)  -0.119** (0.008) -0.138** (0.012)  0.118*  (0.054) 
Employee -0.015  (0.053)  -0.073* (0.034) -0.050 (0.052) -0.383 (0.200) 
Self-employed 0.195**  (0.064)  0.175**  (0.041)  0.175**  (0.063)  -0.190  (0.276) 
Unemployed -0.271**  (0.072)  -0.176**  (0.046) -0.222** (0.069) -0.129 (0.249) 
Urban area  -0.187**  (0.027)  -0.197**  (0.017) -0.184** (0.027)  0.097  (0.121) 
No religion  -3.313**  (0.030)  -2.986**  (0.018) -3.158** (0.028) -3.158** (0.128) 
Protestant -0.367**  (0.037)          -0.451  (0.182) 
Orthodox -0.574**  (0.054)         -0.223  (0.187) 
Christian other  0.761**  (0.112)          0.836**  (0.287) 
Muslim 0.241  (0.221)          0.132  (0.163) 
Jewish -2.027**  (0.538)       -1.378*  (0.568) 
Immigr       0.548**  (0.039)  1.221**  (0.129)     
Immigr*No religion      0.051  (0.070)  0.094  (0.116)     
Immigr*YSM6-10        -0.235 (0.185)  -0.226  (0.182) 
Immigr*YSM11-20         -0.271 (0.161)  -0.256  (0.162) 
Immigr*YSM20+         -0.496** (0.154) -0.337* (0.170) 
Immigr*Language           -0.109 (0.115)  -0.165  (0.117) 
Immigr*Citizen         -0.390** (0.114) -0.096 (0.112) 
                
N obs  84447    91472    91453    7017   
R-squared  0.372     0.325    0.363    0.303   
Notes. 1. Dependent variable: “how religious are you?” Measured on the scale from 1 to 10, 10 indicating higher 
values. It is treated as a continuous variable.  
2. Coefficients from OLS regressions. All regressions are estimated accounting for the population and design survey 
weights.  Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
3. The symbols (**) and (*) represent statistical significance at p<.01 and p<.05, respectively. 
4. Omitted categories of independent variables: out of the labor force; Roman Catholic. 





Table 3. Analysis of Religiosity: How often do you pray? 
 
Variables  Native born  Native born + First generation immigrants  First generation 
immigrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age  -1.217**  (0.299) -0.873**  (0.193) -1.074**  (0.298) 1.331  (1.317) 
Age squared/100  2.632**  (0.344) 2.154**  (0.218) 2.396**  (0.341) -0.259  (1.479) 
Education years  -3.612**  (0.700) -5.463**  (0.481) -5.883**  (0.713) -7.285**  (2.645) 
Education squared  0.140**  (0.024) 0.190**  (0.018) 0.209**  (0.025) 0.271** (0.099) 
Female  33.964**  (1.307) 37.448**  (0.829) 32.377**  (1.309) 29.952**  (5.581) 
N hh members  8.196**  (0.685) 6.374**  (0.361) 8.856**  (0.653) 8.606** (2.680) 
Married  2.482  (1.781) 5.153**  (1.149) 2.289  (1.772) -0.728  (7.437) 
Divorced  8.768**  (2.446) 10.156**  (1.526) 9.843**  (2.422) 28.490**  (10.081) 
Log of hh income  -14.540**  (0.686) -10.599**  (0.441) -10.239**  (0.682) 4.636  (2.843) 
Employee  -3.684  (2.474) -11.036**  (1.734) -5.026* (2.459) -7.014  (9.973) 
Self-employed  6.879* (3.095) -0.057  (2.158) 6.448* (3.078) -5.808  (13.505) 
Unemployed  -9.135**  (3.421) -10.341**  (2.356) -5.900  (3.356) -6.665  (12.982) 
Urban area  -12.399**  (1.418) -7.549**  (0.881) -12.275**  (1.420) 7.994  (6.582) 
No religion  -104.006**  (1.509) -92.530**  (0.805) -90.848**  (1.254) -111.860**  (6.942) 
Protestant  -27.865**  (2.318)      -18.223  (12.108) 
Orthodox  -47.826**  (3.611)      -35.692**  (11.779) 
Christian other  57.195**  (7.199)      84.811**  (17.117) 
Muslim  -9.427  (14.092)      51.067**  (10.915) 
Jewish  -22.556  (31.594)      -88.199**  (29.981) 
Immigr       32.604** (2.610)  75.766** (8.391)     
Immigr*No religion      -14.438** (3.289)  -26.878** (5.525)     
Immigr*YSM6-10      -20.451*  (10.186)  -21.233*  (9.639) 
Immigr*YSM11-20      -28.933**  (9.257)  -29.397**  (8.700) 
Immigr*YSM20+      -18.440*  (8.912)  -20.064*  (9.290) 
Immigr*Language       -3.644  (6.642)  -5.584  (6.466) 
Immigr*Citizen      -10.848  (6.268)  5.219  (6.004) 
          
N obs  83865   90849   90831   6976   
R-squared  0.223   0.198   0.208   0.211   
 
Notes. 1. Dependent variable: how often do you pray? Measured on the scale from 0 to 365, 0 stands for “never”, 365 stands 
for “every day”. It is treated as a continuous variable. 
2. Coefficients from OLS regressions. All regressions are estimated accounting for the population and design survey weights.  
Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
3. The symbols (**) and (*) represent statistical significance at p<.01 and p<.05, respectively. 
4. Omitted categories of independent variables: out of the labor force; Roman Catholic. 





Table 4. Analysis of Religiosity: How often do you attend religious services? 
 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Age  -0.267** (0.069)  -0.334**  (0.051) -0.247**  (0.073)  -0.263  (0.556) 
Age squared/100  0.494** (0.085)  0.624**  (0.060)  0.448**  (0.089)  0.499  (0.630) 
Education years  -0.311 (0.181)  -1.017**  (0.157)  -1.337**  (0.275)  -5.271*  (2.072) 
Education squared  0.013* (0.006)  0.038**  (0.006)  0.046**  (0.010)  0.191*  (0.078) 
Female  2.607** (0.335)  3.051**  (0.205)  1.770**  (0.364)  -3.395  (2.050) 
N hh members  1.705** (0.184)  1.869**  (0.103)  1.896**  (0.182)  1.487  (1.013) 
Married  -0.175 (0.428)  -0.496  (0.307)  -0.103  (0.444)  1.802 (2.684) 
Divorced  -1.444** (0.520)  -1.928**  (0.394) -1.561**  (0.550)  -0.649  (3.120) 
Log of hh income  -2.898** (0.169)  -2.499**  (0.110) -1.768**  (0.199)  -0.915  (1.061) 
Employee  -2.235** (0.627)  -4.104**  (0.549) -2.919**  (0.710)  -5.856  (5.383) 
Self-employed  0.070 (0.871)  -2.854**  (0.638)  -0.325  (0.925)  -4.902  (5.885) 
Unemployed  -4.359** (0.722)  -4.960**  (0.659) -3.278**  (0.851)  -2.307  (6.651) 
Urban area  -1.467** (0.357)  -1.118**  (0.225) -1.646**  (0.383)  2.150  (2.362) 
No religion  -20.668** (0.334) -16.374**  (0.184)  -15.955**  (0.274)  -19.592**  (2.015) 
Protestant  -9.755** (0.510)          3.145  (4.761) 
Orthodox  -16.230** (0.787)         -9.353** (3.359) 
Christian other  15.770** (2.863)         30.618**  (7.711) 
Muslim  0.979 (6.396)          15.171**  (5.015) 
Jewish  -11.356** (3.837)         -2.166  (11.960) 
Immigr      3.129**  (0.784)  15.409**  (3.889)     
Immigr*No religion     -2.397**  (0.839)  -7.887**  (1.819)     
Immigr*YSM6-10         -4.049  (3.366)  -4.002  (3.210) 
Immigr*YSM11-20         -3.131  (3.409)  -2.655  (3.319) 
Immigr*YSM20+         -1.205  (3.280)  -1.210  (3.285) 
Immigr*Language          -3.702  (2.502)  -3.180  (2.259) 
Immigr*Citizen         -3.055  (2.210)  0.319  (2.278) 
               
N obs  84447   91472    91453    7017  
R-squared  0.139   0.103    0.103    0.105   
 
Notes. 1. Dependent variable: how often do you attend religious services? Measured on the scale from 0 to 365, 0 
stands for “never”, 365 stands for “every day”. It is treated as a continuous variable. 
2. Coefficients from OLS regressions. All regressions are estimated accounting for the population and design survey 
weights.  Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
3. The symbols (**) and (*) represent statistical significance at p<.01 and p<.05, respectively. 
4. Omitted categories of independent variables: out of the labor force; Roman Catholic. 
5. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the European Social Survey, 2002-2009. 
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Table 5. Differences in Religiosity by Sub-group of Denomination and Immigrant Type 
Sub-
sample 
Dep. Variable  Native born + First generation 
   Immigr  Immigr*YSM6-10  Immigr*YSM11-20 Immigr*YSM20+  N  obs  R-
squared
No religion  How religious  1.278***  (0.253) -0.179 (0.381) -0.027 (0.305) -0.314 (0.293)  39790  0.033 
  Praying  24.571*** (9.507)  -8.211  (9.856) -5.624 (9.264) -0.189 (9.765)  49674  0.028 
  Attending  3.263** (1.605) -2.193 (1.937) -1.385 (1.870)  -2.975*  (1.658)  39686  0.005 
                
Roman   How religious  1.488***  (0.243) -0.347 (0.289) -0.365 (0.261)  -0.637**  (0.266)  27,598  0.086 
Catholic  Praying  90.708*** (17.330)  -2.093  (20.632) -33.928* (18.783)  -41.906**  (17.064) 27,334 0.147 
  Attending  18.335*** (5.999)  -5.507  (5.321) -11.085* (5.768)  -10.308**  (5.025) 27,655  0.083 
                
Protestant  How religious  0.915*  (0.490) -0.450 (0.557) -0.787 (0.502) -0.394 (0.518)  16,021  0.059 
  Praying  27.537  (27.964) 19.000 (36.355) -5.868 (35.552) 24.736 (35.607)  15,938  0.068 
  Attending  9.947 (6.330)  0.085  (6.601)  -6.646  (7.490)  11.570  (10.718)  16,039  0.054 
                
Orthodox  How religious  0.361 (0.348)  0.949*  (0.490)  0.184  (0.475)  -0.309  (0.468)  5,254  0.073 
  Praying  56.261** (24.314) -16.500 (30.978) -20.121 (28.873) 10.660 (32.175) 5,114 0.119 
  Attending  4.022  (4.144) 1.902 (5.794) 6.748 (7.327) 1.542 (9.726)  5,244  0.041 
                
Christian   How religious  0.516 (0.522)  -0.182  (0.618) -0.088 (0.715) -0.515 (0.672)  1,638  0.082 
other  Praying  49.803  (32.936) -43.294 (47.060) -45.053 (43.895) -51.715 (39.576) 1,630 0.119 
  Attending  -10.408 (13.834) -4.615 (13.016) 0.532 (18.429) -0.243 (15.291)  1,642  0.088 
                 
Muslim  How religious  0.821*  (0.439) -0.840** (0.423)  -0.592  (0.375) -0.795** (0.391) 1,084 0.122 
  Praying  63.041**  (28.516) -70.196** (28.191) -55.576** (25.964) -51.379** (25.839)  1,073  0.125 
  Attending  7.477 (18.508)  -11.847  (13.967)  1.952  (15.059)  9.334  (14.408)  1,077  0.070 
                
Jewish  How religious  3.399** (1.609) -1.446 (1.502) -2.100 (1.773) -1.307 (1.944) 68 0.592 
  Praying  24.400  (105.942)  -17.520  (95.500) -179.907* (94.060)  -95.345  (103.995)  68  0.403 
  Attending  30.594  (50.354)  92.665**  (39.754) 19.087 (26.404) 42.736 (30.143)  68  0.516 
 
Notes. 1. Each line represents a separate regression; where the first row’s heading defines the sub-sample (for 
example, pooled sample of individuals with no religious denomination); and second row’s heading defines the 
dependent variable (for example, “how religious”). 
2. Coefficients from OLS regressions. All regressions include the full set of individual-specific and immigrant-
specific characteristics as in Tables 2-4, and are estimated accounting for the population and design survey 
weights.  Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
3. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) represent statistical significance at p<.01, p<.05, and p<.10, respectively. 





Table 6. Country Characteristics as Determinants of Religiosity 
 
Variables  (1) Native born  (2) Native born and Immigrants  (3) Immigrants 
Belonging major  -0.128** (0.057) -0.128**  (0.054)  0.162  (0.183) 
Relig fragm  -0.839***  (0.058) -0.809***  (0.056)  -0.656**  (0.294) 
Relig freedom  0.349***  (0.093) 0.373***  (0.088)  1.044***  (0.335) 
Social attitudes  0.647*** (0.049) 0.694***  (0.048)  1.373***  (0.283) 
GDP -0.008***  (0.001) -0.007***  (0.001)  0.011**  (0.005) 
Immigr       1.063***  (0.286)     
Immigr*YSM6-10     -0.220  (0.186)  -0.135  (0.189) 















Immigr*YSM20+     -0.577***  (0.135)  -0.363**  (0.177) 
  Immigr*Belonging major at origin      -0.252**  (0.117)  -0.134  (0.160) 
  Immigr*Relig fragm at origin      -0.489**  (0.203)  -0.342  (0.223) 
  Immigr*Relig freedom at origin      0.832***  (0.225)  0.688***  (0.238) 
  Immigr*Social attitudes at origin     0.271  (0.197)  0.231  (0.207) 
 Immigr*GDP  at  origin     -0.021***  (0.004)  -0.027***  (0.004) 
 Immigr*Communist  at  origin      -0.744***  (0.138)  -0.634*** (0.168) 
Belonging major  -30.930*** (3.254) -31.352*** (3.105) -27.319**  (10.722) 
Relig fragm  -57.739*** (3.299) -59.481*** (3.224) -87.250***  (16.458) 
Relig freedom  81.575***  (4.176) 77.285***  (4.077)  48.288***  (17.976) 
Social attitudes  44.220***  (2.785) 47.009***  (2.746)  86.507***  (15.339) 
GDP -0.461***  (0.056) -0.406***  (0.056)  0.352  (0.257) 
Immigr      48.640***  (15.848)    
Immigr*YSM6-10     -10.437  (9.451)  -9.671  (9.651) 









Immigr*YSM20+     -10.609  (7.746)  -10.874  (9.461) 
  Immigr*Belonging major at origin      3.601  (6.826)  -2.229  (10.178) 
  Immigr*Relig fragm at origin     -2.002  (10.981)  9.318  (11.866) 
  Immigr*Relig freedom at origin     37.399*** (12.593)  29.597**  (13.218) 
  Immigr*Social attitudes at origin     16.767  (10.485)  12.114  (10.989) 
 Immigr*GDP  at  origin      -1.726***  (0.216)  -1.995*** (0.237) 
 Immigr*Communist  at  origin      -54.515***  (7.302)  -42.022***  (7.951) 
Belonging major  -2.486***  (0.836) -3.170***  (0.828)  -4.490  (3.528) 
Relig fragm  -16.193*** (0.774) -17.344*** (0.822)  -37.865***  (7.971) 
Relig freedom  12.497***  (1.002) 11.630***  (1.046)  9.493  (5.875) 
Social attitudes  11.180*** (0.714) 12.359***  (0.763)  34.566***  (6.904) 
GDP  -0.159*** (0.015) -0.129***  (0.016)  0.165  (0.121) 
Immigr     3.902  (5.814)     











Immigr*YSM11-20     0.099  (3.410)  1.430  (3.307) 
 Immigr*YSM20+      -0.707  (3.320)  1.378  (3.272) 
  Immigr*Belonging major at origin      -0.943  (2.375)  -2.552  (3.705) 
  Immigr*Relig fragm at origin      -1.349  (3.000)  0.283  (3.224) 
  Immigr*Relig freedom at origin      4.799  (5.255)  4.989  (5.300) 
  Immigr*Social attitudes at origin      12.290***  (3.706)  13.314***  (4.283) 
 Immigr*GDP  at  origin      -0.362***  (0.094)  -0.374*** (0.094) 
 Immigr*Communist  at  origin      -13.735***  (2.895)  -10.045***  (2.697) 
Notes.1. Dependent variables are indicated in the first column. 
2. Coefficients from OLS regressions. All regressions include the full set of individual-specific and immigrant-specific 
characteristics as in Tables 2-4, and are estimated accounting for the population and design survey weights.  Robust 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are shown in parentheses. 
3. The symbols (**) and (*) represent statistical significance at p<.01 and p<.05, respectively. 
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Austria 2971  228  41,20  16 Germany Catholic Catholic  Islam 
Belgium 4169  381  48,53  18 France  Catholic Catholic  Islam 
Switzerland 3423  943  44,86  39 Germany Catholic Catholic  Protestant 
Czech Republic  2047  68  82,76  3 Slovakia Atheist Catholic  Oth.  Christian 
Germany 6485  554  31,55  26 Russia  Catholic Catholic  Islam 
Denmark 4135  191  38,14  15 Turkey  Protestant Islam  Protestant 
Estonia 1542  411  85,11  11 Russia  Protestant Orthodox  Protestant 
Spain 3540  299  7,14  21 Morocco Catholic Catholic  Islam 
Finland 4551  87  12,75  4 Russia  Protestant Protestant  Orthodox 
France 3471  297  62,50  15 Algeria  Catholic Catholic  Islam 
The UK  4916  413  37,28  24 India  Protestant Catholic  Islam 
Greece 2177  255  8,40  10 Albania  Orthodox Orthodox  Islam 
Hungary 3407  45  22,92  4 Romania Catholic Catholic  Protestant 
Ireland 3504  227  24,26  11 The  UK  Catholic Catholic  Protestant 
Luxembourg 778  544  38,00  19 Portugal  Catholic Catholic  Oth.Christian 
The Netherlands  5014  428  48,97  12 Surinam  Atheist Islam  Catholic 
Norway 5320  311  30,75  19 Sweden  Protestant Islam  Protestant 
Poland 4888  31  57,14  3 Germany Catholic Catholic  Islam 
Portugal 3127  151  31,13  8 Brazil  Catholic Catholic  Protestant 
Russia 2967  148  46,10  11 Ukraine  Orthodox Orthodox  Islam 
Sweden 4976  570  48,96  23 Finland  Protestant Islam  Protestant 
Slovenia 2775  159  74,85  5 Bosnia  Catholic Catholic  Orthodox 
Slovakia 2530  47  57,45  3 Czech  Rep.  Catholic Catholic  Oth.Christian 
Ukraine 1734  229  73,58  10 Russia  Orthodox Orthodox  Islam 
Total 84447  7017            
 
Notes. 1. Counted are only the observations of the sample restricted for the analysis, and for which full 
information on all socio-economic characteristics is available. As income is missing for about 20 percent of the 
sample, the original ESS data contains considerably more observations. There is, however, no systematic 
difference between individuals who report and do not report their income in terms of age, gender, education, or 
employment status. The largest numbers of both native and foreign-born income non-reporters are in Portugal 
(12%), Austria (10%), and Spain (10%).  Number of immigrant countries of origin: counted are only countries 
represented by more than 3 immigrants. 
2. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the European Social Survey, 2002-2009, and Association of Religious 
Data Archive, 2005. 
+ “Without a religious affiliation” is the largest group among immigrants in the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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Appendix Table A2.  Definition of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis and Data Sources 
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Variable  Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Dependent variables 
How religious are you?  How religious are you? An index from 0 to 10,  
0 meaning not religious at all, 10 – very religious 
Attending religious 
services 
How often attend religious services apart from special occasions? 
365-every day 
100-more than once a week  
52-once a week 
15-at least once a month 
4-only on special holy days  
1-less often  
0-never 
Praying frequency  How often do you pray? 
365-every day 
100-more than once a week  
52-once a week 
15-at least once a month 
4-only on special holy days  
1-less often  
0-never 
Individual socio-economic characteristics 
Age  Age, ranges from 16 to 70 
Age squared/100  Age squared, divided by 100 
Female  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if female, 0 if male 
Education years  Years of full-time education completed, ranges from 0 to 25 
Education squared  Years of full-time education completed squared 
N hh members  Number of people living regularly as member of household 
Log of hh income 
Logarithm of monthly total household income, constructed from a categorical variable using a mid-
point level. I.e., if income level is between  €1800 and €3600, the value of €2700 is assigned. The 
value of the highest category is its lower bound multiplied by 1,5. Values in national currencies are 
converted into Euro using average exchange rate of the survey year. 
Married  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if married or in a civil partnership, 0 otherwise 
Divorced 
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if divorced, separated, or widowed, 0 otherwise. Benchmark 
category: single (never married) 
Employee  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if works as an employee, zero otherwise 
Self-employed  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if self-employed or working in family business 
Unemployed 
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if unemployed in the past 7 days, actively or inactively looking 















Urban area  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an individual lives in urban area (city, suburb, or town), and 0 
if in a village or a countryside farm 
 
Immigrant -specific characteristics 









How long ago came to live to this country: 
1 if between 6 and 10 years ago 
1 if between 11 and 20 years ago 
1 if over 20 years ago (Benchmark category: five years and less) 
Citizen  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an individual is a citizen of the country of residence, 0 
otherwise 
Language  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an individual speaks any official language of a country of 
residence at home as the first language choice, 0 otherwise 
 
Religion and Country-Specific Variables 
Belong major  A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an individual belongs to the religion which is the main religion 
of the country, 0 otherwise 
Religious fragmentation  Index of religious fragmentation (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, 2003; 
Iannaccone, 1998). Constructed according to the formula: 
2
i   -   1   =   RF
ki k s ∑ , 
where s is a share of k religion denominations in country i (we use first five denominations).This 
index is also known as one minus Herfindahl index, and measures the probability that two randomly 
drawn individuals in country i belong to different religions, which also means that higher values of 
the index represent higher religious fragmentation, hence, heterogeneity. 
Religious freedom 
(recoded from the 
original) 
Freedom of religion. Category responses are the following: 0 = Does not exist. 0.333 = Limited 
and/or rights not protected or restricted.  0.666 = Law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist. 1 = 
Law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government ‘generally respects' this right 
in practice. 
Social attitudes  The index is constructed on the basis of the following questions:  
Societal attitudes towards other or non-traditional religions; conversion to other religions? Do 
attitudes and/or clerical edits discourage proselytizing? Do established or existing religions try to 
shut out new religions in any way? Extent of assertive religious movements in the country? 
0 – low social regulation (tolerant societies); 1 – medium; 2 - high 
Belong major origin 
Religious fragmentation 
at origin 
Religious freedom at 
origin  
Social attitudes at origin 
Similarly defined variables, for immigrants only and for their countries of origin 
 
 
GDP, GDP at origin 
 
Communist at origin 
GDP PPP-adjusted per capita values 
 
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if origin country has ever been under communism, 0 otherwise 
SOURCES:  
 
Jowell R. and the Central Co-ordinating Team. 2009. “European Social Survey: Technical Report”. London: Centre for 
Comparative Social Surveys. City University. Available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
 
Association of Religious Data Archives International Religious Freedom Data, 2005. Available at: http://www.thearda.com/ 
Archive/CrossNational.asp  
 
Grim, Brian J. and Roger Finke (2006). "International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favouritism, and 
Social Regulation of Religion." Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion. 
 
World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI).  
 
World Bank, 2006. World Bank Development Indicators Database. Available at: http://www.world bank.org . Accessed: March 
2010. 38 
 
Appendix Table A3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Native born   Immigrants  Variable 
Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev. 
How religious are you?  4,47 2,91  5,15**  3,05 
Attending religious services  12,20  32,34  14,63**  41,40 
Praying frequency  76,72 136,57  106,53**  153,73 
Age 44,10  14,68  43,55  13,75 
Age squared/100  21,61  12,99  20,85*  12,37 
Female 0,52  0,50  0,53*  0,50 
Education years  12,54 3,79  12,63*  4,34 
Education squared  171,65  101,16  178,44**  116,99 
N  hh  members  2,83 1,40  2,83 1,44 
Log of hh income  7,32 1,06  7,38 1,05 
Married 0,55  0,50  0,58**  0,49 
Divorced  0,15 0,36  0,17**  0,38 
Employee  0,77 0,42  0,77 0,42 
Unemployed 0,05  0,23  0,08**  0,27 
Self-employed 0,11  0,31  0,09**  0,29 
Out of the labour force  0,07 0,25  0,06**  0,24 
Urban area  0,61 0,49  0,75**  0,43 
YSM6-10 0,00  0,00  0,14**  0,35 
YSM10-20 0,00  0,00  0,23**  0,42 
YSM20+ 0,00  0,00  0,46**  0,50 
Citizen  1,00 0,00  0,50**  0,50 
Language  0,95 0,21  0,69**  0,46 
Roman Catholic  0,31  0,46  0,25**  0,43 
Protestant 0,18  0,39  0,09**  0,28 
Orthodox 0,05  0,22  0,11**  0,31 
Muslim 0,00  0,05  0,12**  0,32 
Jewish 0,00  0,02  0,00**  0,06 
Other Christian  0,02  0,13  0,04**  0,19 
No religion  0,44  0,50  0,39**  0,49 
Belong major  0,50  0,50  0,31**  0,46 
Religious fragmentation  0,49  0,24  0,54**  0,25 
Religious freedom  0,77  0,19  0,75*  0,18 
Social attitudes  0,76  0,28  0,74*  0,33 
GDP /1000  31,04  17,31  37,51** 18,13 
Belong major origin      0,42 0,49 
Religious fragm. origin      0,46 0,26 
Religious freedom origin      0,63  0,27 
Social attitudes origin      0,80  0,32 
Former communist      0,34  0,47 
GDP /1000 at origin      15,07  15,47 
Sample size  84447  7017   
Notes.1. The sample includes males and females aged 16 to 70. Native-born without citizenship, as well as 
immigrants with unknown country of birth are excluded from the sample. Native-born with one or both foreign-
born parents are excluded. Individuals with “other religion” or missing religious belonging are also excluded. 
2. The symbols (**) and (*) represent statistical significance of 1% and 5% respectively of differences of means of 
individual characteristics, based on a t-test for differences of sample means. 
3. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 